Pursuing terrorist and militant organizations active within Pakistan is crucial to success in identifying and arresting militancy.
The following I would like to share with you why our Police is not so successful:
1. A lack of coordination between police, the civilian-run Intelligence Bureau, and the military-run intelligence agencies (e.g., Inter-Services Intelligence, Military Intelligence, etc). The lack of trust between civil and military agencies also plays a negative role. Even today, to get data from telephone companies (and trace calls made by criminals and terrorists), the police and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) have to request intelligence agencies – and, at times, such delays waste crucial time.
2. A poor data collection capability as regards crimes and criminals. Many criminals who joined militant religious groups are not traced and tracked efficiently. Even banned militant organizations are not well profiled.31 In many instances, such organizations continue their publications and, in some cases, wanted criminals and terrorists simply change their affiliations to those groups that are not under government scrutiny. All the while, the police remain clueless. They police are also handicapped as many militant groups were producing “freedom fighters” for Kashmir and Afghanistan in the 1990s and had working relations with elements in the intelligences services. Hence, many police officials were reluctant to go after them, thinking that they might be held accountable for “harassing” an intelligence agency’s assets.32 According to Asif Akhtar Shah, Deputy Inspector General of Police in Mardan (NWFP), his force “lacks the technical expertise, training or equipment to hunt down big-name terrorists or even identify would-be suicide bombers.”33
3. In July 2003 the Special Investigations Group (SIG), under the FIA, was created to interrogate terrorists, identify and arrest the most wanted terrorists, detect terrorist financing, and coordinate with the provincial government in investigating major terrorist incidents Its strength, however, is surprisingly low and insufficient: thirty-seven investigators supported by thirteen experts led by a Deputy Inspector General of Police.34 Media reports indicate that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was expected to train SIG officials on “how-to-locate weapons of mass destruction, take post-blast action, trace terror financing, investigate money-laundering, combat corruption within law enforcing agencies, manage crises and improve techniques
for fingerprinting and interviewing.”35 Since 2003, on average, only four to five FIA and police officials have visited America every year for short FBI training courses. In other words, such collaboration and cooperation has been quite limited so far.36
4. No special security measures or rewards are provided to police officials, investigators, and lower court judges
involved in pursuing counterterrorism cases. Consequently, a few of them have been assassinated in targeted killings, which further demoralizes the police and discourages their anti-terrorism efforts. Moreover, the police are increasingly victims of terror attacks, especially in the NWFP, Islamabad, Lahore, and Quetta.37
5. The NWFP’s police were not provided with adequate resources, despite their persistent requests in 2006-07, when it was apparent to all and sundry that Pakistani Taliban were focused on expanding their influence in the various districts (especially Hangu, Kohat, D.I., Khan and, most importantly, Swat). The Swat case is even more troubling, for according to Mr. Bangash, the district police chief, around 700 out of a total of 1,737 policemen deserted when Swat’s Maulana Fazlullah told the local police to give up their jobs or face the Taliban’s wrath.38 Neither the provincial nor the federal government offered any countermeasures in terms of special incentives. In the NWFP, the figures speak for themselves: the province’s 55,000-member police force (manning 217 police stations) in reality means one policeman for every 364 miles of some of the world’s most dangerous terrain.39 In January 2009, the US embassy in Islamabad announced its plan to provide
$4.1 million worth of police equipment to NWFP including troop carriers, motorcycles, ballistic helmets, and bullet proof vests - a bit belated but positive initiative.40 Earlier, in June 2008, US Consulate in Peshawar had provided some office equipment to the NWFP police as a goodwill gesture.
6. Militant groups offer higher incentives to their potential recruits than do the police officers fighting terrorism. For instance, the former pay more than $20,000 to the families of “successful” suicide bombers; the government gives $6,000 to a policeman’s family if he is killed during a terrorist attack.41
Reforms in Pakistan; crucial for Counter insurgency and Counter terrorism Success – Hassan Abbas
References:
31 Interview with an official of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), March 2007.
32 See Hassan Abbas, “Police Reforms: Agenda of Change,” The News, March 4, 2008.
33 Gannon, “AP IMPACT: Pakistan police losing terrorism fight.”
34 Quoted in a presentation, entitled “Terrorism in Punjab,” by senior police official Sarmad Saeed
(currently director of the National Police Academy, Islamabad). Available at http://www.sarmadsaeed.
com.
35 The News, December 4, 2003.
36 See “SIG joins police probe into Lankan team attack,” The News, March 5, 2009.
37 See Laura King, “Suicide bomber targets Pakistan anti-terrorism police,” Los Angeles Times,
October 10, 2008. Also see Tahir Niaz, “725 killed in 63 terrorist attacks,” Daily Times, December
31, 2008.
38 Figures quoted in GEO TV talk show Capital Talk (anchor: Hamid Mir), February 5, 2009.
39 For NWFP Police statistics, see http://nwfp.gov.pk.
40 “United States Provides Security Equipment to the Frontier Police”, Press Release, Embassy of
the US, Islamabad, January 14, 2009.
41 Figures quoted in Gannon, “AP IMPACT: Pakistan police losing terrorism fight.”
